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A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY*
by Peter W. Schroth**
To an American lawyer taking a first look at Yugoslavian prod-
ucts liability, what is most striking is the similarity of your rules and
ours. Upon deeper reflection, the similarity appears more superficial,
and the underlying differences in the two systems appear more im-
portant. Nevertheless, since understanding each other's systems is
only part of the purpose of closer relationships between the lawyers
and legal scholars of our two countries, I think it is important to pay
special attention to what we share. Accordingly, I will devote parts
I and II of this article to the similarity of the rules and the funda-
mental differences between the systems in which these rules are
used. In part III, I will discuss some recent developments and trends
in American products liability, and in the conclusion I will discuss
the tendency of our systems to find similar solutions to what are, at
base, similar problems.
* This was the keynote address of part 2 of the Second Bilateral Scientific
Conference of United States and Yugoslav Jurists, held in Belgrade, August
16-21, 1978. All of the papers from the Conference appeared in Serbian or
Macedonian in Pravni Zivot, the leading Serbian-language law review.
** Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. 1966, Shimer
College; J.D. 1969, M. Comp. L. 1971, University of Chicago; S.J.D. 1979, Uni-
versity of Michigan. I am grateful for the research assistance of Kathryn A.
Roessel and Peter Noto, students at New York Law School.
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I. The Similarity of the Rules
Yugoslavian private law appears to a common lawyer to be very
much in the general European tradition.1 The Inheritance from
Roman law is still apparent in many areas, especially from the part of
what is called "Roman" law that was developed by the Italian 5Iloa.
tors and commentators and their successors, and later by the German
legal scholars.
Our habit in the United States is to study the French and West
German civil law, and to assume that these give us a good basis for
understanding the systems of other Western civil-law jurisdictions.
We often go on to study the Soviet system and Russian civil law as
the prototype for Eastern Europe. Americans thus are quite Sur-
prised to find the private-law system in Yugoslavia much more
closely resembling that of France than that of Russia. But once we
absorb the fact that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
not quite as far from Western Europe as its Communist name and its
difficult languages might lead us to expect, the fact that the code
which has acted as a bridge between you and us is Austrian, rather
than French or German, is a relatively minor matter. (For the
American lawyers in the audience, however, let me note that Yugo-
slavian products liability bears little resemblance to that of Austria,
which is much less advanced.) And when your new Law of Obliga-
tions takes effect later this year, we should find mutual understand-
ing even easier, since instead of searching from the ABGB through
the writers and the decisions we will be able to begin our study with
a modern statement of the law. I hope that we will soon have an
English translation of this new code to assist our studies.
We really should not be surprised that Yugoslavian law is
so much in the Roman tradition, since most of the world's legal
systems are more or less in the Roman tradition. What Is much more
1. For general descriptions of Yugoslavian private law In English, sm
A. 0. CmN.O Yuou.Av Covu. LAW: HKvov. 'a.,.v. Povenrv (1970);
Blagojevi , YugoslAs, 1 INTSMINATiONAL NyNOaPDIA OF CONPAMAIrVS LAW
Y-5 (1975); INlTIn'tu or COmPARAIVe LAW. Gum ' TH u YugosLaV LzeAa.
SvWM- (1977).
2. A good English translation of the ABGB (Aligemeines b&rgulc1
Gesetzbuch) by Paul L. Baeck was published In 1972 by the Parker School of
Columbia University, and is available from Oceana Publications, Inc. It is based
on the amended text in effect in Austria, however, rather than on the different
versions used in parts of Yugoslavia.
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significant, and what we would surely find astonishing if it were not
so familiar, is the extent to which English and American law man-
aged to escape the Roman influence almost completely.
England, after all, had been a Roman colony for 400 years, end-
ing in the early part of the fifth century, and the Roman influence of
the Christian Church was never driven out of Wales. Christianity and
the potential for Roman private law returned to England with St.
Augustine about 600, where the Roman Catholic influence grew
stronger in almost every period until the Reformation of the six-
teenth century. The Norman conquest in 1066 was by an army car-
rying the Pope's banner; and canon law, which was largely based on
Roman law, was enforced by the church courts in England for several
centuries thereafter. Oxford University taught Roman law and
canon law almost from its beginning in the twelfth century, and the
great Bracton's thirteenth-century treatise was thoroughly in and of
the Roman-law tradition of Azo and Bologna University.
But the point I wish to emphasize is that the judges and ser-
jeants who developed the common law in the period between
Bracton and the Reformation did so in nearly total isolation from
Roman law. 3 Their system was almost purely procedural on its sur-
face, the overt question being whether the King's writ would issue.
If it did, the trial was held somewhere else, without their participa-
tion. The substantive rules which became the common law of
England were implicit in the procedures that determined whether the
writ would issue, but because they were only implicit it was pos-
sible to think that only procedural questions were involved. And
procedural questions, then as now, were matters of the lex fori
and not points on which Roman law seemed relevant.
These pleaders and judges were not, in general, scholars of
Roman and canon law, and when they were they usually did not mix
this learning with their work in the English courts. It is true that
the parallel system of equity, which rose to power in the sixteenth
century, brought some of the ideas of the canon law back as a
counterbalance to the common law. And it is true that common
law and equity have largely merged into a unified system in modern
England and America. But after Bracton in the 1250's there was
not another scholarly treatise on the whole law of England until
Blackstone in the 1760's, and by that time the common law had so
long been isolated from general scholarship that it had permanently
3. The best treatment of this subject is J. DAWSON. THI ORACLES OF
T1E LAW 1-99 (1968).
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established its independence from the legal traditions of the rest of
the Western World.
The common law came to America in the form of Blackstone's
treatise, which could be carried in a lawyer's saddlebags, rather than
of the more cumbersome English Year Books and case reports. It
is probably fair to say that Blackstone saved the common law in
America, for had it not been given to us in such a convenient form,
we probably would have succumbed to the temptation to join the
other great revolutionary people of the late eighteenth century, the
French, in adopting a civil code. As it was, we came very close, 4
but like Savigny's Germany we postponed codification, and like
Germany when we finally began to codify our law we produced
something uniquely our own.
What we produced in America was a series of commercial sta-
tutes around 1900 which, taken together, amounted to a commer-
cial code, and then a very different comprehensive statute around
1950 which is called a Uniform Commercial Code. Neither is very
close to Blackstone and English law, since most of the commercial
practices for which they were designed developed during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries.5  They were based primarily on
American case law, and much of the Uniform Commercial Code may
be read as a pointed lecture by the great comparatist 6 Karl
Llewellyn,7 its drafter, telling the judges not to be slaves to rules or
codes, but rather to consider the evolving patterns of business and
society and to explain their reasons in the common law tradition. 8
Your courts seem to have felt free to depart from the rules of the
Austrian and Serbian civil codes to the extent that these rules were
outdated, and I hope that they will feel the same sort of freedom
in dealing with the Law of Obligations a few years from now, when it
also becomes outdated. Whether in Austria, or in France, or in
Yugoslavia, or in America, it is only the process of continual re-
4. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 67-75, 133-37
(1974).
5. See Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 461
(1967).
6. See M. RHEINSTEIN, EINPUHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 72-76
(1974).
7. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960).
8. See Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975).
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interpretation that keeps a code alive and valuable.
What we did not produce, and perhaps never shall produce,
is a civil code. On the contrary, we have the Restatements of the
Law, the work of committees of law professors, judges and attor-
neys, and while these documents look refreshingly like codes to
foreign lawyers who are lost in the wilderness of our case law, they
are not designed for enactment anywhere. They are also not a de-
scription of the existing law of anywhere, and to some extent the
tendency in recent versions has been to propose reform rather than
to restate the law.
A final point here is that American law is now even more iso-
lated from the community of legal thinking in the rest of the world
than England's was in centuries past. Our ignorance of foreign lan-
guages has become legendary: where they used to be required for
admission to the universities, they are no longer required even for
graduation, and at many schools the pre-law students are advised
against studying languages. The decline in the practical use of com-
parative law in developing American law which began with the First
World War against Germany was slowed by the great European
scholars who came to us as refugees from the Nazis in the 1930's
and 1940's. But the decline has never entirely stopped, and as these
men reach the end of their careers it threatens to accelerate again.
Comparative law is taught at all to only a small fraction of American
law students, and it is taught seriously and well to extremely few.
While excellent comparative scholarship is still found in the United
States, the benefits almost all flow outward, to the world which
studies us far more carefully than we study it.
I have taken so long in making this point that you may have
forgotten what it was, so let me summarize: your private law is di-
rectly descended from the new Roman law of the Middle Ages, ad-
mittedly with some important changes to meet modern conditions,
while ours is separated from that root by at least three formidable
barriers. First the early English common-law courts cut themselves
off from Roman and canonist learning; then American courts, which
got their English law through Blackstone's filter anyway, turned
their attention to American problems9 and to the decisions of
American courts; and now the American legal profession generally
is closing its eyes to the world. And yet for all of that, your rules
on products liability are so much like ours that with only cosmetic
9. See also M. HoRWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-860 (1977).
[Vol. I
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
changes they could pass for those of an American state.
1 0
In both countries, products liability may be based on contract,
negligence or strict tort, and it is possible, as it is in West Germany
but is not in France, to claim more than one in the same action.
Our version of contractual warranties is now found in sections 2-313
through 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code. We define an ex-
press warranty as a promise, description or sample which becomes
part of the "basis of the bargain." There are also implied warranties,
which are imposed by law unless excluded or modified by the parties
to the contract. The most important of these are merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose.
Merchantability is an open concept, whose attributes may be
increased by case law, but includes at least fitness for the ordinary
uses of goods of that type, and reasonable safety. There is an im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when the seller has
reason to know of the buyer's purpose and that he is relying on the
seller to select or to furnish suitable goods.
If a statute providing for full damages for breach of warranties
to the consumer had existed in Yugoslavia, perhaps your courts
would not have been willing to hold that tort law applied to the same
cases. In the same way, American courts have been urged to apply
only the rules of the Uniform Commercial Code in products cases, to
the exclusion of tort theories.1 1 A few months ago I would have
told you that American courts were generally unconcerned with the
overlap between tort and contract theories: that each was consid-
ered independently, and if both happened to apply to the same facts,
10. For what follows, I rely primarily on three articles by Yugoslav
scholars: Mati6, Survey of Yugoslav Law Relating to Products Liability, 2
HAGUE-ZAGREa ESSAYS 35 (1978); Pak, Development of Yugoslav Law Relating
to Products Liability, 2 HAGuE-ZAGREB ESSAYS 41 (1978); and especially the
Yugoslav national report of Professor jakov Radigie for the Tenth International
Congress of Comparative Law, which will take place next week in Budapest,
YUGOSLAV REPORTS FOR THE TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 41 (1978). My own national report for that Congress, which contains a
great deal of documentation not repeated here, has been published in LAW IN THE
U.S.A. IN THE BICENTENNIAL ERA, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. supplerrent 67 (1978).
11. For a good discussion of both sides, with further citations, see Wade,
Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Pre-empted by the UCC
and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1974). Professor Wade
concludes that § 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code can coexist, and I
agree.
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the plaintiff could plead both, provided only that he could not
recover twice.
Some doubt is cast on this by the latest decision of the highest
court of New York, Martin v. Julius Dierck Equipment Co. 1  In
earlier decisions, the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and California,
which are the most advanced in products liability, had disagreed on
the extent to which tort theories could be used when the parties had
a contractual relationship. The New Jersey court's position was that
the newly developed theory of strict liability in tort could be applied
even to purely economic losses. In that case the plaintiff had pur-
chased carpeting with defects that made it less valuable, but not dan-
gerous. 1 3 If tort law can be used even in this area, the statutory limi-
tations on recovery in contract have little meaning. The California
court, in a case where the plaintiff had purchased a truck that did
not perform adequately for its business, expressly rejected the New
Jersey view, holding instead that strict liability in tort was the ap-
propriate theory only when physical injuries were involved. 14
Notice that both the New jersey and the California approaches
leave a great many cases in which tort and contract theories are both
permissible. In the Martin decision, on the other hand, the New
York Court of Appeals seems to be saying that each has its proper
sphere. Although there is a technical basis on which it could be ar-
gued that the decision relates only to its peculiar facts,15 the sweep-
ing language used by the court suggests that we would be wiser to
expect that it will take the same approach in future cases. If so, the
New York rule will be that a plaintiff not in privity of contract with
the defendant may sue only in tort and not in contract. Assuming
that the New York courts continue to hold that purely economic
losses may be recovered only in contract and not in tort, plaintiffs
12. 43 N.Y.2d 583, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 374 N.E.2d 97 (1978).
13. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965).
14. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965) Traynor, J.). In a separate opinion Justice Peters argued for still an-
other rule: that strict liability be availah~e so long as the plaintiff is an "ordi-
nary consumer" rather than a party able to bargain on equal terms with the
seller.
15. Formally, Martin is only an interpretation of a New York statute on
conflict of laws, CPLR § 202.
16. See Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc.2d 477, 148
N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955). This is the rule in most states, and is in accord with §
402A of the RESrATEMENT ISrcoNo) of Towrs, which provides for liability only
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will be able to plead both theories simultaneously only if they are in
privity of contract with the defendant and physical harm is involved.
In most states, however, the rule is still, as it is in Yugoslavia,
that contract and tort theories may be pleaded together, at least if
there is physical harm. Outside New York, privity of contract is not
required either in warranty or in tort. A decision by judge Cardozo
of New York in 1916 allowing product negligence suits without
privity17 was quickly followed by most states, and eventually by all.
Meanwhile, the courts began to abolish the privity requirement for
implied warranties of the fitness of food, 18 then for express repre-
sentations in the manufacturer's advertising literature, 19 and finally
for an implied warranty of general safety for all products.20 This
last rule was adopted by the courts and legislatures of many states in
the early 1960's, and its various forms were inserted into the Uni-
form Commercial Code as alternatives: each state legislature was to
decide which of three versions of warranty liability it preferred.
21
in cases of "physical harm."
17. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916).
18. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
19. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on re-
hearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
20. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
21. The official Alternative revisions of § 2-318 are as follows:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected. to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to
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In practice, many states adopted one of the three, but several either
made up versions of their own or omitted the section entirely.
Almost simultaneously, however, the courts began to base prod-
uct liability on strict tort theories, that is, with no requirement of
negligence. California's Justice Traynor had argued for this approach
since 1944,22 and in 1963 he finally convinced the rest of the
California Supreme Court. 23 Justice Traynor was also a member of
the advisory committee for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
section 402A, which appeared at about the same time, embodied the
strict tort theory. 2
4
Since about 1963, then, strict warranty liability without privity
has been competing with strict tort liability without privity. In
general, the strict tort theory, which allows fewer defenses, has been
emphasized by plaintiffs and adopted more widely. At least 44 of
the 50 states recognize strict products liability in tort, although most
of them also recognize warranty products liability in some form. But
the Restatement has been no more successful in unifying the law
than has the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, several states,
including California and New Jersey, have refused to accept the Re-
statement's requirement that a defective product be "unreasonably
whom the warranty extends.
22. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 461, 150
P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion).
23. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
24. The official version of § 402A is as follows:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
[Vol. I
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dangerous" to permit recovery,25 although over 20 other states have
so far accepted it.
As in Yugoslavia, it is clear that family members and authorized
users of the product ordinarily have as much right to recover as does
the purchaser. The Restatement does not mention bystanders, but
most of the states, like the Yugoslavian courts, have held that they
are also protected. 6 Our cases probably should be read as holding
that anyone injured by a defective product may sue on a strict lia-
bility basis.
Our cases are also tending toward the rule that anyone involved
in the manufacture or distribution of a defective product is strictly
liable if it causes injury. Among those who have been recognized
as appropriate defendants are the manufacturer, including a manu-
facturer of component parts and anyone purporting to be a manu-
facturer, the designer, assembler, importer, distributor, wholesaler,
retailer, trade association, independent advertiser, independent test-
ing laboratory, installer, second-hand dealer, bailor, lessor, licensor,
hair-dresser, builder, finance company and repairman. A successor
corporation may be liable for the torts of the company whose assets
it has purchased, 27 and there are a few cases in which all manufac-
turers of a product have been held jointly liable when the guilty
manufacturer could not be identified.
28
As I understand the Yugoslavian law, manufacturers may be
held strictly liable, but except for possible contractual liability,
retailers and other non-manufacturers face only a presumption of
fault, which may be overcome by proof that they did not know or
25. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. 8 Cal.2d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501
P.2d 1153 (1972).
26. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652,
451 P.2d 84 (1969).
27. Ray v. Alad Corp. 19 Cal.3d 22, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3
(1977); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974);
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Turner v. Bituminous
Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); contra, Leannis v.
Cincinnati-Forte Co., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977). See Elser, Products Lia-
bility-Liability of Successor Corporations, 12 FORUM 928 (1977); Comment,
Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-an Assault on
Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. Riv. 584 (1977).
28. Forel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (manufacturers of asbestos); Chance v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. N.Y. 1972) (manufacturers
of blasting caps).
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could not have known of the defect. In most American states, manu-
facturers, retailers and all other defendants are subject to strict lia-
bility. Some of the states, however, have something like the Yugo-
slavian rule in what is called the "sealed container exception." In
those states, if the defect cannot be discovered by ordinary inspec-
tion, persons other than the manufacturer usually cannot be held
liable in strict tort or implied warranty, 29 although they may be
liable for their negligence or an express warranty. Despite its name,
the rule is applied in those states to products which do not come in
sealed containers, such as automobiles. Also, a few states have re-
cently passed statutes limiting strict liability to actions against manu-
facturers, and allowing suits against the seller only for his express
warranty or negligence; I will return to this in Part 111.30
Our defenses are also similar to yours. In the last nine years,
most of the states have discarded the old common-law rule that
any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff bars all
recovery in a negligence case. Although some have adopted the
"pure" form of comparative negligence followed in Yugoslavia and
most of the world, 3 1 most provide that contributory negligence
either less than 32 or not greater than" the negligence of the de-
fendant no longer bars but only reduces recovery.
Contributory negligence is always at least a partial defense in
a negligence case. One of the Restatement's Comments states that
29. McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965); Wood v.
Hub Motor Co., 110 Ga. App. 101, 137 S.E.2d 674 (1964); Pierce v. Liberty
Furniture Co., 141 Ga. App. 175, 233 S.E.2d 33 (1977); Ratliff v. Porter Cable
Co., 210 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. La. 1962); Wiikes v. Memphis Grocery Co., 23
Tenn. App. 550, 134 S.W.2d 929 (1939); 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Chap. 703, eff.
July 1, 1978.
30. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text infra.
31. By statute: Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island, Washington. By
judicial decision: Alaska, California, Florida.
32. This is referred to as "50% bar," and is the law of Arkansas,
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Wyoming.
33. This is called "51% bar," and is the law of Connecticut, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont
and Wisconsin.
34. A few states have special forms: plaintiff's "slight" negligence re-
duces rather than bars in Nebraska and South Dakota. Plaintiff's "remote" neg-
ligence is no bar in Tennessee, by judicial decision. There are special statutes
providing for comparative negligence in particular kinds of cases, such as em-
ployer/employee suits or suits against common carriers, in several other states.
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contributory negligence is not a defense in strict tort, 35 and this is
the majority rule, but several states have disagreed. I predicted last
year that the change to comparative negligence would make this con-
clusion easier to reach, and that more states would now reject the
logical position of the Restatement. 36 Since then California and
Minnesota have done so, 3 7 and I am sure that the partial defense of
comparative negligence in strict tort will soon be the rule in the
majority of states, as it is in Yugoslavia.
In implied warranty, many states have held that contributory
negligence is at least a partial defense. Express warranty, on the
other hand, invites the buyer's reliance and makes failure to discover
a defect less likely to be considered blameworthy; accordingly, con-
tributory negligence usually is no defense.
Like you, we generally recognize misuse of the product as a de-
fense, but American cases add that a product should be safe for fore-
seeable misuse. Thus there is tort liability for automobiles which do
not reasonably protect their occupants in a crash. 38 A similar rule
has been applied to motorcycles,39 small airplanes,40 and most
35. Commentn to §402A.
36. Schroth, note l0supra, at 78.
37. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 927, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
575 P.2d 1162 (1978); Busch v. General Motors Corp., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn.
1977). The defense has also been allowed recently in federal admiralty products
liability cases, Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co.,
565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977); "pure" comparative negligence is now used in
federal admiralty cases. Other states recognizing the defense include Butaud v.
Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1976); West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976), 547 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.
1977); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976); Edward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Mississippi law); Stephen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N. H. 248, 266 A.2d
855 (1970); Mohr v. B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co., 147 N. J. Super. 279, 371 A.2d
288 (1977); N.Y. CPLR § 1411; General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. 1977); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Note
that all of these are comparative negligence states. On the other hand, the
defense has also been rejected recently in a few comparative negligence states.
1977 Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 77-335, eff. June 7, 1977; Brown v. Link Belt Corp.,
565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977) (Oregon law); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d
795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska law).
38. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Huff
v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 305
N.E.2d 769 (1973).
19791
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
recently a telephone pole which (when struck by an automobile) col-
lapsed and injured two children.
Contingent fees are sometimes excessive if unregulated, particu-
larly when the plaintiffs are ignorant or the recoveries especially
high. The courts of New York and New Jersey have taken the lead
in limiting contingent fees to the levels which many lawyers in other
states charge without regulation. 42 I am dismayed by the negative
reaction of scholars in other countries to contracts de quota litis,
since our experience has for the most part been good. Controlled
contingent fees would benefit consumers and accident victims in
many other countries which now forbid them entirely.
Once a lawyer has accepted the case, he begins an extensive
process of preparation and discovery. Expert witnesses, who are usu-
ally selected and paid by the parties and their lawyers rather than by
the court, are generally approached immediately, and often assist
throughout the preparation of the case. In addition to providing
advice on technical matters, they may conduct tests and carry out
research which can be used as evidence at the trial.
American discovery procedures are vastly more thorough than
those employed in other countries and routinely require disclosure
to the adverse party of information foreign corporations might be
unwilling to share with their own lawyers. Discovery is controlled
by the lawyers, but the judge, who usually is not present, is often re-
quested to rule on disputed points or to compel responses.
The exact forms of discovery vary from state to state, but four
40. 'Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Nos. 72-4267 and 72-4281 (Lane
Cty. Ct., Ore., july, 1976). See Donnelly, Aircraft Crashworthiness: Plain-
tiff's Viewpoint, 42 J. AiR L. & CoM. 57 (1976); Reid, Practical Aspects of
GeneralAviation Litigation, 40 J. AiR L. & CoM. 661 (1974).
41. Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., No. 339703 (Middlesex Cty. Super.
Ct., Mass., Dec. 22, 1977); Kasputys v. Boston Edison Co., No. 330325 (Middle-
sex Cty. Super. Ct., Mass., Dec. 22, 1977). These cases are discussed in 21 ATLA.
L. REP. 101-104 (1978).
42. N.J.S.A. CT. R. 1:21-7; N.Y.CT. R. 603.7(e), 691.20(e), 806.4,
1022.30. See ATLA v. Supreme Court, 126 N.J. Super. 577,316 A.2d 19, aff'd,
66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974); Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 188 N.Y.S.2d
491, 160 N.E.2d 43 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960). Both rules have
schedules by which the percentage allowed as a fee decreases as the amount re-
covered increases. The New York rules, however, permit the lawyer to take a
straight 33 1/3 percent instead. In New Jersey, and in New York when the
straight 33 1/3 percent is not elected, the lawyer may appeal for a higher fee in
extraordinary circumstances.
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are common. The first is written interrogatories, which in federal
courts are unlimited in number and length. State courts, on the
other hand, often impose limits, and all courts have some power to
limit unduly annoying or expensive interrogatories. The names of
witnesses, the facts they know and the opinions they hold are all
discoverable.
The second method is depositions of potential witnesses, includ-
ing parties, employees and experts. These are usually oral question-
and-answer sessions, with opportunities for cross-examination. The
proceedings are taken down by a stenographer, and are usually tape-
recorded and sometimes even videotaped in addition.
The third method is requests to produce documents and objects
for inspection, photography and testing, and the fourth is requests
for admission of facts and of the genuineness of documents. In the
latter case, silence is treated as admission, and in case of unreason-
able denial either party may be required to pay the other's costs of
proving that point.
This is about as far as most cases go. Once the parties have a de-
tailed understanding of each other's positions, they can usually agree
on a settlement without trial, and most estimates are that about 97
or 98% of cases are settled.
If the case goes to trial, however, by far the most important
factor is that almost uniquely American institution, the civil jury.
Unlike even England, where the civil jury was all but abolished in
1966, 4 3 we normally rely on juries if torts cases go to trial. Over
85% of products trials are jury trials, and the proportion seems to be
rising.
Nothing about our law of products liability can be properly un-
derstood unless the jury is considered. Our rules of evidence, which
exclude much relevant but unfair or misleading evidence, are de-
signed to protect the integrity of jury trials, but they are also used
when the judge sits alone. Plaintiffs may rely on negligence when
strict liability is legally available, and prove fault when they could
simply claim res ipsa loquitur (a doctrine permitting proof of negli-
gence by circumstantial evidence44), because juries are thought to be
more willing to require payment from those who are at fault. On the
other hand, plaintiffs may be careful to limit their arguments to
43. Ward v. lames, 119661 1 Q.B. 273.
44. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1974).
See generally s. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LoQuiTuR (1972,
plus annual pocket supplements).
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strict liability theories to keep the defense from introducing evidence
of due care for exactly the same reason.
Since the jurors are likely to be looking for fault regardless of
the judge's instructions, the defense seeks out opportunities to show
that its behavior was careful and reasonable. If the plaintiff's theory
is negligence, the defendant's evidence of due care is obviously rele-
vant and admissible. Even in strict tort or warranty, however, the de-
fendant often finds an opportunity. For example, the plaintiff must
always prove that the defect existed at the time the product left the
defendant's control, and this frequently gives the defendant a chance
to introduce evidence of its careful manufacturing and inspection
procedures to show that the defect could not have existed at that
time.
II. The Underlying Differences
I will leave the more detailed exposition of these matters to
Professor Wagner, and turn to some practical differences between
the two systems. It seems to me that the differences in our methods
of preparing cases and conducting trials are so great that the super-
ficial similarity of your rules and ours may be seriously misleading.
Let me begin with a person who has been injured by a defective
product, and follow him through the various steps toward recovery
of damages. The victim must first seek out a lawyer who special-
izes in products cases, since the field has become so complex and
difficult that unusual expertise is required. If the lawyer thinks the
case is substantial enough to be worth his while, they will enter into
a contingent-fee contract, under which the lawyer is paid a percent-
age of the award or settlement if he is successful, and nothing if he is
not.
From the lawyer's point of view, what must be considered is
that a simple products case may require twenty to fifty hours of
preparation prior to trial, while a major case may require several hun-
dred hours of preparation. With a typical contingent fee of one
third, the lawyer who devotes a mere twenty hours to a simple case
involving a foreign object in a bottled drink and wins a typical $1500
for his client will gross only $25 per hour. Since he must pay for his
office, secretary, books, supplies and so forth, as well as supporting
himself and paying taxes, he simply cannot afford to try the case for
that amount. What he can afford to do is to refuse it, or to settle it
quickly out of court for a much smaller sum. Neither the lawyer
nor the contingent-fee system can be blamed for this failure of jus-
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tice, however, since the number of hours of preparation which our
system requires for effective presentation of a products case simply
cannot be justified when the amount in controversy is so small.
In a serious case, however, such as one involving paralysis, ex-
tensive burns or blindness, the contingent-fee system shows its merit.
If the plaintiff had to be prepared to pay his lawyer for the hundreds
of hours of preparation sometimes required in such cases, only the
wealthy could sue. In the United States, legal aid ordinarily is not
available to plaintiffs in damage suits. Although we normally do not
require the losing party to pay the winning party's attorney, that rule
would only make things worse for the victim who is not absolutely
certain of winning, and many meritorious claims might never be
filed. With a contingent fee, lawyers are willing to take cases which
seem likely to succeed at their own risk. The use of a contingent fee
seems to have little effect on the amount of the verdict or settle-
ment, but does permit less-wealthy persons to sue, since they pay
the full cost of the attorney's services only if successful.
In the last few years, American trial lawyers have developed ex-
tremely sophisticated techniques for presenting complex evidence to
the jury. There are artists who specialize in preparing maps, diagrams
and charts for trial use, often with clear plastic overlays which allow
particular aspects to be emphasized. Still photography, movies and
more recently videotape are used extensively. Craftsmen are hired to
construct detailed, working models of the product, or cutaway
models showing its insides. Chemical demonstrations and actual ex-
periments and tests with the product are often carried out right in
the courtroom. Recently computer-generated models and simula-
tions have begun to be offered in evidence, and it probably will not
be long before they too become standard.
If the plaintiff wins, his recovery will be far more than it would
be in Yugoslavia, and probably far more than in any other country in
the world. This is of course largely because of the jury, but also be-
cause our judges feel more actively involved in lawmaking, and be-
cause our trial lawyers are highly skilled in dramatizing the evidence.
With nothing like paragraph 1324 of the Austrian Code 4 5 to
hold them back, our courts have always felt equally free to award
damages for lost profits and for pain and suffering whether liability
45. In Baeck's translation, note 2 supra, "In case of damage caused by
malice or gross negligence, the person injured is entitled to demand full satisfac-
tion, and in other cases only indemnity. Where the general expression 'damages'
occurs in the law, it is to be interpreted pursuant hereto."
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was based on malice, gross negligence, ordinary negligence or strict
tort theories. Since damages for pain and suffering are not consid-
ered to be based on the defendant's fault, but rather to be compen-
satory, juries are allowed to assess them rather freely, although ex-
cessive verdicts may be reduced by the judge or the appellate court.
If malice can be shown, punitive damage awards are allowed in addi-
tion, and they have even been permitted in a few strict liability
cases.
46
To give you an idea of the amounts of money involved in these
cases in the United States, here is a brief summary of all eight of the
cases reported in the most recent issue of the monthly A TLA Law
Reporter :47
-An airconditioning workman was seriously burned when
the compressor unit on which he was working exploded.
Settled out of court for $235,000.
-A 43-year-old man was killed at a picnic when an alumi-
num beer keg exploded. Settled out of court for
$350,000.
-The foot of a 1 0-year-old boy was mangled in a farm ma-
chine which had a protective grating with holes too large
to protect him. Settled out of court for $140,000.
-A large bakery was destroyed by fire when plastic foam
labeled "self-extinguishing" was used near an oven and
turned out to be highly flammable. Settled out of court
for $742,000.
-An 18-year-old worker lost his arm in a gravel crusher
which had no protective screen. Settled out of court for
$262,000.
-A 20-year-old man was totally paralyzed and rendered
unable to speak when he was hit by an object thrown by
a power lawnmower. Settled out of court for $775,000.
-A large truck carrying liquefied petroleum gas overturned
and exploded, killing 17 persons, including the driver,
and burning 25 more. Jury verdicts totalled over
$50,000,000, including $1 ,000,000 punitive damages.
The largest award was $20,300,000 to a teen-aged by-
stander who suffered extensive burns.
-The 53-year-old driver of a concrete-mixing truck was
46. See generally Owen, Pumitive Damages in Products Liability Litiga-
tion, 74 MicH. L. REV. 1257 (1976).
47. 21 ATLA L. R5P. 230-32 (!une 1978).
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crushed to death when a tire blew out and the truck
crashed into an embankment. jury verdict for $159,000.
III. Recent Developments
Until this year, it would have been safe to conclude a discussion
of American products liability without mentioning any statutes ex-
cept the Uniform Commercial Code. Even the Uniform Commercial
Code was designed to encourage case-law development, and every im-
portant step in the evolution of products liability from the nine-
teenth century until 1977 was taken by the courts rather than by
Congress or the state legislature.
This has suddenly changed. Before 1977, only two states had
significant products liability statutes other than the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 48 and three more were passed during 1977. 49 But
during the first six months of 1978, the legislatures of eleven states
passed major laws dealing with products liability,50 and bills are now
pending in many more. The content of these new laws varies widely
from state to state, but most of them deal with "statutes of repose"
and the defenses of subsequent alteration and conformity to the
"state of the art."
As a general rule, a tort action for personal injury or property
damage must be brought within a set period from the date of the
injury or from the date when it is discovered. In most states, this
statute of limitations is either two or three years, and the range is
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a; FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2). See also KAN.
STAT. § 60-513(b); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 516.097, 516.105; N. C. GEN. STAT. §
1-15.
49. CoLo. Rev. STAT. §§ 13-80-127.5, 13-21-401 et seq.; On. Ruv. STAT.
§§ 30.900 et seq.; UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 78-15-1 et seq.
50. 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Chap. 19, eff. 90 days after adjournment of
the 1978 session of the Legislature; 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 78-380, vetoed
by the Governor, June 7, 1978; 1978 Ga. Laws, Act 1485, eff. July 1, 1978;
1978 Ind. Acts, H.B. 1396, eff. June 1, 1978; 1978 Ky. Acts, S. B. 119, eff.
June 26, 1978; 1978 Minn. Laws, Chap. 738, eff. April 15, 1978; 1978 Neb.
Laws, L.B. 665, eff. July 22, 1978; 1978 N.H. Laws, Chap. 31, eff. Aug. 22,
1978; 1978 R.I. Pub. Laws, Chap. 299, eff. July 1, 1978; 1.978 S.D. Sess. Laws,
H.B. 1116, eff. July 1, 1978; 1978 Tenn Pub. Acts, Chap. 703, eff. July 1, 197&
In subsequent footnotes, these statutes are cited simply by the names of the
states.
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from one to six years.51  Since there is no limit running from the
date of manufacture or sale, it is at least theoretically possible that a
person might now be injured by a product defectively manufactured
100 years ago or more, and could sue the manufacturing company,
or its successor,52 in strict tort.
Products-liability rules have been changing so rapidly in the
1960's and 1970's that much shorter periods seem like centuries to
the insurers and self-insuring companies affected. Accordingly,
several of the statutes that have been passed recently provide that
products actions are completely barred ten years after the product is
sold, 53 while others bar the actions six, 54 eight 55 or twelve56 years
after the sale. One state bars all actions twelve years from the date
of manufacture instead of from the date of sale,57 and another uses
both types of limit barring all actions ten years after manufacture or
six years after sale. 58
Now six years is much more than the useful life of some prod-
ucts, and twelve years is much less than the useful life of others.
Such arbitrary standards are certainly bad policy, and it has been
argued that they may even violate the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection. 59  Minnesota's new law60 re-
sponds to this in the manner of Llewellyn's part of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 61  It bars products liability actions after the
product's ordinary useful life, and gives the court six factors to be
considered, along with any others that seem relevant, in determining
51. It should be noted that the period may be different for personal in-
iury than for property damage. When they are different, usually a longer period
is provided for property damage than for personal injury, but in Montana and
Utah a longer period is provided for personal injury. The two periods are
the same in 33 states.
52. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
53. Georgia, Indiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Tennessee. A few states
have general statutes of repose, not limited to products liability, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-15(b) (ten years).
54. South Dakota.
55. Oregon; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a.
56. Arizona; FLA. STAr. § 95.031(2).
57. New Hampshire.
58. Utah.
59. E.g., Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation: A New Im-
munity for Product Suppliers, 1977 INS. L. J. 535.
60. See note 50supra.
61. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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whether the ordinary useful life had expired. 62 Other states have
recognized that products have varying useful lives in much less satis-
factory ways, either by treating the arbitrary number of years as
raising only a rebuttable presumption that there was no defect,6 3
or by making useful life an additional requirement for the plaintiff.
Under the latter rule, the action must be brought within ten years
from the date of sale or within one year after the expiration of the
anticipated life of the product, whichever is shorter.64
With the exception of Minnesota's then, the new "statutes of
repose" are blunt instruments brought to bear on a subtle problem
which it would have been better to have left to the courts. The new
provisions on subsequent alteration and "state of the art" similarly
suggest ignorance or passion on the part of the legislators, resulting
62. 1978 Minn. Laws, Chap. 738, adds a new section, MINN. STAT.
604.03:
Useful Life of Product
Subdivision 1. In any action for the recovery of
damages for personal injury, death or property damage
arising out of the manufacture, sale, use or consumption
of a product, it is a defense to claim against a designer,
manufacturer, distributor or seller of the product or a
part thereof, that the injury was sustained following the
expiration of the ordinary useful life of the product.
Subd. 2. The useful life of a product is not nec-
essarily the life inherent in the product, but is the period
during which with reasonable safety the product should
be useful to the user. This period shall be determined
by reference to the experience of users of similar prod-
ucts, taking into account present conditions and past
developments, including but not limited to (1) wear and
tear or deterioration from natural causes, (2) the prog-
ress of the art, economic changes, inventions and devel-
opments within the industry, (3) the climatic and other
local conditions peculiar to the user, (4) the policy of
the user and similar users as to repairs, renewals and re-
placements, (5) the useful life as stated by the designer,
manufacturer, distributor, or seller of the product in
brochures or pamphlets furnished with the product or in
a notice attached to the product, and (6) any modifica-
tion of the product by the user.
63. This is the rule in Kentucky five years after sale or eight years after
manufacture. In Colorado there is a rebuttable presumption ten years after sale
that the manufacturer was not negligent and that all warnings and instructions
were proper and adequate.
64. Tennessee.
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from intensive lobbying by insurers and manufacturers.
The case law is quite clear that modifications of a product after
it leaves the manufacturer's control may be raised if the result is that
the defendant's action is no longer the proximate cause of the injury;
in fact, the plaintiff is often required to prove that the product
reached him without substantial change. 65 Nevertheless, the legis-
latures of nine states have recently confirmed by statute that altera-
tion of the product after it leaves the defendant's control may be
raised as a defense, 66 apparently under the illusion that they were
making new law.
The "state-of-the-art" defense, on the other hand, may make a
real difference in the law. The problem here is that the eight new
state statutes making conformity to the "state of the art" at the
time of manufacture a defense define the term "state of the art" in
eight different ways. I will leave the details to a footnote, 67 but
observe here that the term refers sometimes to governmental stan-
dards, sometimes to industry standards and sometimes to what is
65. E.g., Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn.
549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556,447 P.2d
248 (1968); Clarke v. Brockway Motor Trucks, 372 F. Supp. 1342 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
66. Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah.
67. Arizona: if allegations of defective design or manufacturing, con-
formity to state of the art when sold by defendant is a complete defense.
Colorado: in any products liability case, conformity to governmental and
industry standards raises a rebuttable presumption that the product was not
defective, while nonconformity raises a rebuttable presumption of defective or
negligent manufacture. Indiana: if allegations of defective design, conformity
to the generally recognized state of the art is a complete defense. Kentucky: if
allegations of defective design, manufacturing or testing, conformity to the gen-
erally recognized and prevailing state of the art raises a rebuttable presumption
that the product was not defective. Nebraska: if allegations of negligent or de-
fective design, testing or labeling, conformity to the generally recognized and
prevailing state of the art (defined as the best technology available at the time)
is a complete defense. New Hampshire: complete defense that the risks were
not discoverable using prevailing techniques under the state of the art and using
procedures required by state and federal agencies. Tennessee: whether the
product was defective and unreasonably dangerous when manufactured or sold
is to be determined according to scientific and technological knowledge available
at that time, rather than at the time of injury. Utah: if allegations of defective
design, conformity to government standards raises a rebuttable presumption that
the product was not defective.
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"discoverable" and is all too often entirely undefined. Whatever it
means, the manufacturer's conformity to it may be an absolute de-
fense, or only raise a presumption either that the product was not de-
fective or that it was not unreasonably dangerous. And the defense or
presumption may apply only in cases based on design defects, in those
plus others such as testing and labeling, or in all product cases.
No other significant statutory changes have been made by more
than a few states. Four have now provided that strict liability ac-
tions may no longer be brought against a seller who is not the manu-
facturer, at least unless the manufacturer is beyond reach. 68 These
statutes do not expressly provide that there is a presumption that the
seller is negligent, which seems to be the case in Yugoslavia, but
sometimes this is the result if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ap-
plies.69 The purpose, however, is plainly to make the manufacturer
primarily liable, with the non-negligent seller available as an alterna-
tive source of compensation only if the manufacturer is unidenti-
fiable, insolvent or not subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts.
Two states have recently adopted statutes confirming the exist-
ing rule that misuse of the product is a defense, 70 and two others
have confirmed the universal rule of evidence71 that subsequent
measures taken by the defendant are not admissible to show fault,
although they remain admissible for other purposes. 72 Finally, some
state legislatures have recognized their lack of information on which
products-liability statutes should be based, and have, like the federal
government, 73 ordered that further studies be made. 74
68. Colorado, Kentucky, Nebraska, Tennessee.
69. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
70. Arizona, Indiana.
71. E.g., UNIFORm RULE OF EVIoENCE 51; FED. R. Evio. 407.
72. Nebraska; 1978 Va. Acts, Chap. 165, eff. July 1, 1978.
73. The FINAL REPORT of the Interagency Task Force on Products Lia-
bility, issued in November 1977, was preceded by a LEGAL STUDY, an iNSURANCE
STUDY and an INDUSTRY STUDY. The Task Force includes the Departments of
Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development,
Justice, Labor, Transportation and Treasury, the Council of Economic Advisors,
the Office of Management and Budget and the Small Business Administration.
Perhaps the most important effect of the studies has been to shatter some of the
myths contributing to the "crisis" in products liability. For example, I esti-
mated last year that there were "50,000 or more" products-liability cases being
filed each year, "and the number is no longer rising rapidly," in sharp contrast to
insurance industry assertions of 1,000,000 or so. Schroth, note 10supra, at 67.
The FINAL REPORT says about 60,000 to 70,000 products-liability claims were
filed in 1976.
74. E.g., 1978 Minn. Laws, Chap. 644.
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The federal Congress presumably will digest the information it
has recently received from a series of major studies by an Interagency
Task Force on Products Liability75 and produce some sort of legisla-
tion, but as of July 31, 1978, none of the dozens of bills that have
been introduced had even been scheduled for a hearing. Most of
these bills deal with tax deductions for products-liability reserves
or trusts, but a few would affect the substantive law. Bills intro-
duced by Congressman LaFalce, for example, would establish federal
rules of products liability to which the states would be required to
conform. 7 6  It appears-and I might add that I hope-that these
misguided proposals have no chance whatever of becoming law.
A much more important reform would be some mechanism for
making products-liability insurance available at reasonable rates to
small manufacturers. While large companies usually have no diffi-
culty in paying for insurance and in satisfying judgments, some
small companies have had great difficulty, and some have even been
driven out of business. In 1976, for example, only 3% of manufac-
turing firms with over $100 million gross sales did without products-
liability insurance, while 29% of those with gross sales of less than
$2,500,000 were uninsured. This is the one part of the so-called
"crisis" in products liability that seems to be real, but neither
Congress nor the states have taken any significant action as yet.
77
In short, the statutes which have been passed mostly fail to
speak to any real problems, and do speak loudly, though sometimes
incoherently, to problems that do not exist. There is no objective
crisis in American products liability, but some of the insurance
companies and manufacturers have succeeded in creating the illusion
of one. It is possible, even easy, to create the illusion because
lawyers, legislators and the public are ignorant about products lia-
bility, which in the United States is an exceedlingly complicated
subject.
But it has been especially easy for the insurance companies to
create the illusion of a crisis because the insurance companies have
until very recently had complete control of all the data. Products-
liability statistics are not even offered to the public in insurers'
Annual Statements, but rather buried under the general heading
"liability other than automobile or medical malpractice." I think
75. See note 73 supra.
76. H.R. 11788 and 12470, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
77. Some bills have been introduced in Congress, e.g., S. 403 and H.R.
9155, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), but no action has been taken so far.
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it was Mark Twain who said that a lie can go halfway around the
world while the truth is putting on his shoes, and we have just shown
that it can stampede more than a dozen state legislatures along the
way.
Conclusion
If I seem to have belittled the extraordinary convergence be-
tween American and Yugoslavian products liability, let me re-
emphasize it now. Given the general nature of the two systems of
law, which will not be changed just for products liability, it is diffi-
cult to see how these rules could become much more similar than
they are, even if we set out consciously to imitate one another.
Since I know that we have not been imitating you-indeed, probably
only a handful of Americans are even aware that there is strict lia-
bility in Yugoslavia-and since I doubt that you are imitating us,
how do we account for the similarity in a world in which most of
the industrialized countries still require fault?
In the United States, the general tendency of the courts is
toward very strict liability, and except for the new "statutes of
repose," the legislatures have done very little to interfere. At the
same time, there is a strong movement for direct compensation
plans, which would pay for injuries without judicial proceedings.
No-fault insurance plans of various kinds have now been adopted by
many of the states for automobile accidents, and it is proposed that
this principle be extended to other sorts of accidents, including
those caused by defective products.78
Thus we are tending to eliminate the need to prove fault in
products cases for two different, but related, groups of reasons. We
are turning to strict liability in tort because it more effectively places
the costs on those who can control them, who are primarily the
manufacturers and secondarily the distributors and retailers. They
can reduce the costs of accidents by producing safe products, by
supplying better warranties, by inspecting and testing more
thoroughly and by purchasing insurance at the lower rates available
for large groups. 7 9 The courts feel justified in allowing these eco-
78. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE
FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975).
79. See generallV G. CALADRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL
AND EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS (1970).
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nomic principles to play a major role, to the disadvantage of defend-
ants, in part because the difficulty of proving fault in matters as
complex as defective products places plaintiffs at a very serious dis-
advantage under the traditional negligence law.
80
We are urged to go beyond strict liability in tort to no-fault in-
surance liability for the same reasons, plus the additional point that
the tort system as it is used for products liability in the United States
is extremely expensive. It appears, for example, that of every $100
now spent on products-liability insurance, only about $45 finds its
way to accident victims.81 The rest goes to the lawyers for plantiff
and defendant, to the expert witnesses and others who assist in
preparation and trial, and to the insurance companies. An insurance
system which paid claims simply on proof of loss and causation,
rather than on proof of fault or defect, would have lower operating
costs and could pay much more to victims without an increase in
premiums. It is argued that this would more than compensate for
the loss in fairness and in incentives for manufacturers to use due
care.
I can only speculate on the reasons why Yugoslavia is adopting
much the same reforms that we are, but it is clear that the reasons
cannot be entirely the same. Certainly products are as complex in
Yugoslavia as in America, so the burden of proving fault or defect
must be similarly severe, and perhaps unfair to the accident victim.
But trials are not so costly and complex in Yugoslavia, and I am sure
that a higher percentage of the total amount invested in your insur-
ance and liability systems must be used to compensate accident vic-
times than is the case in our country.
One of the most basic principles of the Yugoslavian system is
self-management by the working people. The conflict we have in
America between manufacturers and consumers should thus in
theory be eliminated, since the working people are both the con-
sumers and the manufacturers. Thus whatever conflict exists in
determining social policy must be between the interest group of con-
sumers and the interest group of workers, and these are nearly
identical. If this is true, then there is much less need to locate blame
in your system, and socialist morality can focus on the economically
80. See generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d
453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (concurring opinion of Traynor, J.); Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d
897 (1963) (opinion of the court by Traynor, J.).
81. For the calculations, see Schroth, note 10 supra, at 80.
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correct allocation of the social costs of production, which include
injuries to consumers.
What I am suggesting is that for our quite different reasons
we may both be stripping away the old systems that required a
search for fault, revealing the underlying economic principles com-
mon to all modern societies. Perhaps if we can emphasize our shared
problems in these and future discussions, we legal scholars can play
a role in reducing the conflicts, and in encouraging the peoples of
the world to think of themselves as the inhabitants of a planet too
small for enemies and wars.
